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The implications of law-making in the World Trade Organization (WfO) 1
continue to grow in importance. In 1994, participants hoped that the WfO
would juclicialize the trade regime. Over the last seven years, we have seen that
hope realized. The WfO has registered over 200 complaints.2 Over 40
Appellate Body or Panel reports have been adopted.3 The examination of the
WfO has progressed from one of speculation as to how things will work to one
where we can now speculate where things will go.
The juclicialization of the WfO and the growing importance of the dispute
resolution mechanism mirror the worldwide trend toward a more binding
international dispute resolution. Europeans have long been accustomed to
binding rulings handed down by both the European Court ofJustice (ECJ) and
the European Court of Human Rights. Other examples of this trend include the
growing case load of the International Court ofJustice, the push for the creation
of the International Criminal Court, the increasing strength of the InterAmerican Human Rights Court, the creation of the Law of the Sea Tribunal, and
the growing actions of both ad hoc tribunals dealingwith human rights violations
in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Yet as these other judicial bodies continue to expand
and grow in strength, international observers cannot help but be struck by the
number and diversity of cases from the WfO.
The cases concern a wide variety of goods and particular issues and, perhaps
even more importantly, involve a large number of countries. Developed
countries have brought cases against one another and against developing
countries for the enforcement of trade law:' Developing countries have also had
a few problems in using the WfO against mote developed countries, as well as
against each other.5 Yet, it is the breadth and depth of the dispute resolution
rulings coming out of the WfO that has now led to a closer examination of the

* Assistant Professor ofLaw, Marquette University Law School. 11tis paper was originally
presented at The World Tmde Organiz.ation a11d the S1171mm ofGmbal Govtr1ta11a Sympo.ri11111 sponsored
by Widener University School of Law. I am grateful to many of the participants, including
Frederick Abbott, Jose Alvarez,John Barrett, Petros Mavroidis, and Samuel Murumba for their
helpful commentary.
t. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994
(hereinafter WI'Q Agreement], THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TExTs 3 (1999) (hereinafter LEGAL TEXTS).
2. See Overview of the State-of-Play ofWl'O Disputes al http://www.wto.org/en'l}ish/
tratop_e/ dispu_e.html (Nov. 21, 2000) [hereinafter wro State-of-Play].
3. Id.
4. Developed countries have brought 123 matters to the WI'O. Ste WI'O State-of-Play,
s,,pm note 2, at 71.
5. Developed countries have brought 46 matters to the WI'O of which 21 were against
other developing countries. See WI'O State-of-Play, s,,pmnote 2, at 71, 72.
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WfO. After all, if the WfO started slowly with very few cases like many of its
international judicial predecessors, this examination would not yet be occurring.
The WfO is a victim of its own success.
This article examines a variety of different questions regarding the WfO, not
the least of which concerns the legitimacy of the WfO. Another question
includes whether the WfO is the right place to handle the issues that it does?
Should the WTO be ruling on environmental issues? On labor and social issues?
On intellectual property issues? Furthermore, should the WfO be modified so
that some of these concerns can be addressed? In answering these questions, this
article first looks at the issue oflegitimacy from the perspective of how the WTO
was originally conceived. Second, this article reviews several proposals for
increasing legitimacy in the WfO. Third, I examine the battle over amicus briefs
at the WTO and apply theories of judicial decision-making to help shed light on
the battle. Finally, this article concludes by demonstrating what the amicus brief
battle can tell us and what it cannot

I. LEGITIMACY OF wro DISPUlE RESOLUTION
In examining the legitimacy of the WfO, we must determine the answers to
three historic questions from the perspective of decision-makers present at the
formation of the WfO. Was the expansion into environmental, social, and
cultural issues planned by the Member States when drafting the WfO? Second,
even if this was not planned, have members since accepted this expansion? And
finally, has civil society also accepted the expansion of the WfO?
A. Was Expansion Planned l!J Members?
This first question looks at what Member States were planning when they sat
down to negotiate the WfO. Did the members actually expect that the dispute
resolution system would be as binding as it is? Did the Member States expect
that the WfO's case load would expand so rapidly into issues beyond trade? The
expansion of international organizations is not new per se. One only has to
examine the history of the European Union (EU) to see that organizations can
expand their coverage areas over time without the express intent of the
founders. 6 While it is not surprising that the WTO's coverage of expected issues
would expand over time, it is perhaps surprising the speed with which this is
occurring.
Clearly there are certain parts of the WfO agreements that specifically set
forth the balancing act the WTO is supposed to engage in when ruling on

6. J.H.H. Weiler, TheTransformatio11ofE11rope, l00YALEL.J.2403,2437-53 (1991) (explaining
how the EU mutated beyond its original jurisdiction through extension, absorption, incorporation
and expansion of different areas of the law).
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environmental or other social issues.7 One could also argue that it would be
naive for any Member State to expect that environmental issues, in particular,
would not be addressed by the WfO, given the fact that even prior panels arising
out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) had ruled that
certain environmental measures are a violation of the GATT. 8 However,
intellectual property is expressly included in the WTO system with the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In the cases to date
dealing with these "trade and ..." issues, the backlash from Member States and
commentators has been swift.9 As one writer notes,
Whether it is wise to vest such far-reaching power in the WTO and its dispute
settlement system in this politically sensitive and problematic area is questionable.
It now appears from the developing case law that this sweeping transfer of
jurisdiction to the WfO dispute settlement authorities was accomplished with little
planning or reflection. 10

We could conclude that these forays into "trade and ..." issues were probably
anticipated by Member States, both because of express treaty language and some
expectation that the case load would expand. Even if they were not, we can ask
the next questions to test their legitimacy.

B. It the Expansion ofIuuet Accepted by Member.r?
Even if members did not anticipate that the WfO dispute resolution system
would be ruling on these broader issues, members could show the legitimacy of
7. Su, t.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,Art. XX, LEGAL TExTs,
s,,pra note 1, at 423, 455-56; General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), WfO Agreement,
Annex 1B, Art. XIV,LEGAL TExTs, s,,pranotc 1, at 284, 296-97; Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WfO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL TEXTS, s,pra note 1, at
59,67-68.
8. GAIT Dispute Panel Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports ofTuna, GAIT
B.I.S.D., (39th Supp.) at 155 (unadopted 1991), 30 I.LM. 1594. Su, t.g., Thomas E. Skilton, GAIT
and the Environment in Conflict: The T11na-Dolphi11 Disp11tt a11d tht Q11tslfor a11 International Conservation
Strattt,1, 26 CORNELLINT'LLJ.455 (1993) (reacting to the GATT decision against the United States'
law banning the import of tuna caught with non-dolphin friendly nets); Richard W. Parker, The Use
andAb11st ofTradt Ltvera1,e to Protect the Globa/Com111011J: What Wt Can LJl1f'1tjrom tht T11na-Dolphin
Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L REV. 1 (1999) (pointing out where unilateral actions can be
helpful).
9. Seq,entral/JJoel P. Trachtman, The Domai11 ofWTO Disp11te R.esollllion, 40 HARV. INT'LLJ.
333 (1999) (describing the concerns over WfO jurisdiction). Ste also Symposium, Linkage a.r
Phtnomtno11: An Intmlisdp.ina,y Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 709 (1998) (discussing a
,
number of"tradc and ..." issues).
10. Thcofanis Christoforou, Settltm,nt of Science-Based Trade Disp11/ls in th, WTO: A Critical
Rn,ie,v of tht Developing Cast Lnv in the Face of Scientific Un&tl"lainty, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 622, 622
(2000). See also Jeffery Atik, Science a11d I11ternational RJ1,11hto,y Con11t11,tnce, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L & Bus.
736 (1996-97) (arguing that consistent scientific standards arc needed).
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the WTO's actions by accepting such rulings in practice later on. Continuing the
earlier analogy to the EU, as the EU expanded into social, human rights, and
environmental areas, the Member States demonstrated their acceptance of this
path in two ways. First, these areas are drafted expressly into EU law in later
amendments to the Treaty of Rome11 and separate treaties. 12 Second, the
Member States themsdves demonstrated their acceptance through their
compliance with such rulings. Member States of the EU followed rulings of the
ECJ in these expanded areas and continued to respect the supremacy of ECJ law.
In fact, the high courts of several Member States only fully accepted the
supremacy of the EC] after the EC] had incorporated human rights into its case
law.13
The same pattern can be found in the WTO. At this point, the use of the
WTO remains high. Not only have Member States used the dispute resolution
system, they have also generally complied with even unfavorable rulings.
Member States of the wro have as an agenda for discussion in various pands
little concerning the subject matter of the WTO. 14 Indeed, proposed reforms to
the WfO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (DSU) 15 have focused on the process thus far and not the scope of

11. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1997 in TREATIES
EsTABLlSHING TI-IE EUROPEAN COMMUNmBS (ESC, EEC, EAEC)-SINGLE EUROPEAN
ACT-OTHER BASIC INSTRUMENTS 115, mmpiltd l!J Commission of the European Communities
{Abridged Ed. 1987) (hereinafter EUROPE].
12. For example, the Single European Act added the environment to the purview of the
European Community. Single European Act, signed at Luxembourg on Feb. 17, 1986 and at The
Hague on Feb. 28, 1986, in EUROPE, mpra note 11, at 523. The Treaty on European Union (the
Maastrict Treaty) added politics and foreign policy, among other new areas. Treaty on European
Union (freaty ofMaastricht), Feb. 1, 1992, in Richard Corbett, THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT 382
(1993).
13. See, e.g., Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-Und Vorratsstelle fur
Getreide und Futtermittel (Solange I) (Gennan Federal Constitution Court] (Case 2 BvL 52/71)
May 29, 1974 (1974] 2 CMLR 540, (holding that as long as (solange) the EC did not provide for
fundamental rights, the German Constitutional Court would retain the right to review EC) decisions
to see if these decisions also upheld the basic human rights provided for in the German Basic Law);
Re the Application ofWunsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II) [German Federal-Constitution
Court] (Case 2 BvR 197/83), October 22, 1986 (1987] 3 CMLR 225, (holding that since the ECJ
ha.~ now established a standard of fundamental rights, the German Constitutional Court will no
longer review the validity of EU legislation). For an overview, see Andrew Clapham, E11ropean
Union--The H11111an Rights Challenge in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A
CRmCALOVERVIEW 114 (1991).
14. Trade and Environment Material on the WfO Website, at http:/ /www.wto.org/
english/trntop_e/envir_e/ envir_e.html. (last visited Jan. 22, 2001).
15. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, wro
Agreement, LEGAL TExTs, mpra note 1, at 354, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1226 (hereinafter DSU].
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the case load. 16 Therefore, it is evident that this expansion into new areas has
been accepted by WfO Member States.

C Has the Expanded Case uad been Accepted by Civil Sodety?
This leaves the last question of whether other actors in Member States feel the
same way about the WfO's expanded case load. Unfortunately, while Member
States seem to have either planned or acquiesced in the WTO's handling of nontrade issues, many private actors feel quite differently. The protests in Seattle
were only the quite public culmination of the concern that the WfO places trade
values above other (more legitimate) values.
Regarding the private actor's concerns about the WfO, there are three issues:
(1) the WfO is the wrong forum for many of these issues; (2) the WTO's whole
process is opaque and difficult to understand; and (3) state actors might not
adequately represent the peoples' interests. First, many argue that the trade
panels of the WTO are not equipped and do not have the expertise to be able to
rule on complex environmental or intellectual property issues. 17 More
compellingly, critics argue that trade panels, by their very designation, place trade
values above other more important social issues. While domestic governments
can be expected to balance trade with other values, critics worry that an
international body will have supremacy without the broader world view in mind.
Second, private actors complain that the WTO dispute resolution process is
not sufficiently transparent Briefs and other submissions to the dispute
resolution process are not made public. Oral arguments are closed. Reports are
leaked, but not released. The lack of information about each case makes the
process more suspect Private actors are even less likely to trust a decision made
by the WTO when they have no idea how that decision was reached. Finally,
private actors complain about their inability to participate in the process. While
certain Member States provide indirect ways for their respective civil society to
lodge complaints that may proceed to the WTO,18 this applies to only certain
16. Set, t.g., Chad Bowman, Experts Complain WTO Disp11lt Stllltmtnt is Slo111, IU-Dtjintd, and
Often Un111ct1ssfa4 15 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 43 at 1840 (Nov. 4, 1998); Daniel Pruzin, NorthSo11th Sta!tmalt Conlin11t.r in Talks on Refo1111 oJWTO Disp11/t Procm ful!t.r, 16 lnt'I Trade Rep. (BNA),
No. 40 at 1647 (Oct 13, 1999).
17. Kevin C. Kennedy, Why Multilatemlism Matters in Resolving Trade-Environment
Disputes, Address at the Symposium on the World Trade Organization and the Structure of Global
Governance (Oct 6-7, 2000) in 7 WIDENERL. SYMP. J. 31 (2001). S tt alro Albert Mumma, Address
at the Symposium on the World Trade Organization and the Structure of Global Governance {Oct.
6-7, 2000) (on file with The Witkntr lA,v Sympo1111111 ]o111'1tal).
18. Section 301 allows an individual to petition the United States government to initiate trade
dispute resolutions. Under section 302 a party can petition the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) to investigate a foreign government's policies or practices that are suspected to be hindering
trade. Stt 19 U.S.C. § 2412. The EU also has a procedure whereby private actors can reque.~t the
EU take action against those governments violating free trade agreements. Stt Council Regulation
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states and still relies on a Member State to bring the complaint. The Member
State could, of course, choose not to bring the complaint to the WI'O.
In the end, private actors could argue that had they known about the process
problems in the WI'O, coupled with the expansion into non-trade areas, they
would have fought harder in the drafting and ratification process of the
agreement establishing the WI'O. Either they could have tried to block the
agreement or they could have tried to modify it to include reforms dealing with
panel expertise, balancing values, transparency, and participation.

II.

PROPOSALS FOR INCREASING LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY

Given the critiques of the WI'O system, there have been numerous
suggestions for how to reform the dispute resolution process. This section
outlines some of the more prominent suggestions and the status of that proposed
reform.

A Stop
Those critics most concerned with the increasing breadth of the WI'O subject
matter argue that the WI'O should basically stop hearing those cases that deal
with non-trade values. During the recent Symposium on the WI'O held in
October 2000, many presented arguments for why the WI'O should not be
hearing environmental, 19 intellectual property2° or other types of cases that
require the WfO to balance trade values with broader social values.
Commentators argue that a separate World Environmental Organization is
necessary or that the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) should
be playing more of a role in intellectual property disputes.21
3286/94, 1994 O.J. (L 349) 71 (on Trade Barriers Regulation] Qaying down EU procedures in the
field of common commercial policy). See a/.ro Petros C. Mavroidis & Werner Zdouc, uga/ M,ans
to Protect Private Parties' Intmst.r i11 the WTO: The Cos, ofthe EC Nt111 Tratk Barriers &g11/ation, 1 J. INT'L
ECON. L., 407-32 (1998).
19. Richard W. Parker, The Case for Environmental Trade Sanctions, Address at the
Symposium on the World Trade Organization and the Structure of Global Governance (Oct 6-7,
2000) in 7WJDENERL. SYMP. J. 21 (2001) (arguing for better WfO criteria in environmental cases).
B11t see Andrew L. Strauss, From GATI'zj/la to the Gmn Giant: Winning th, Environmental Batt/,far the
So11/ ofthe WorldTratk 011,dlliz.ation, 19 U. PA.J. INT'LEcON. L. 769 (1998) (arguing that the WTO
has some clear advantages for adjudicating environmental issues).
20. Samuel Murumba, Address at the Symposium on the World Tmde Organization and the
Structure of Global Governance (Oct 6-7, 2000) (on file with The Witflner Law Symposi11111 ]011rnal);
John Mugabe, A.ddress at the Symposium on the World Trade Organization and the Structure of
Global Governance (Oct 6-7, 2000) (on file with The Witfentr LawSymposi11111 ]011,na/).
21. See, 1.g., DANIEL C. Es'I"Y, GREENING THE GATI: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE
FUTURE 73-98 (1994) (proposing a Global Environmental Organization).
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At this point, it is unlikely that the WfO will take a step back from these
controversial cases. It is more likely that the Appdlate Body will increasingly use
language demonstrating its ability to properly balance these issues, as in the
Shrimp-Turtle decision,22 and to attempt to persuade detractors in this way.
While the WfO will probably not be adding issues to its plate in the future (as
in the failed talks on services negotiations),23 there is little political will to cut back
on the WTO's purview.

B. Increase Participation in 'Rule-Making
Another proposal is to increase the private actor's, and in particular NonGovernmental Organizations (N GOs), participation in the rule-making from the
outset. As the GATI Agreement establishing the wro is amended, interpreted,
and enforced, NGOs should be part of the process. In this way, when guidelines
and rules are established regarding the balancing of trade with other values, the
NGOs can ensure that the rules will reflect their concerns. 24 From this
perspective, if the WTO is going to be dealing with these issues, it might as well
have better guidance from the outset.
On the other hand, the proponents of increased NGO involvement assume
that NGOs will provide different and varying perspectives from their respective
national governments, thereby ensuring that a broader set of values will be
included in the wro balancing act. However, is this in fact the case? One
recent study of NGO involvement in rule-making found that the NGOs were far
more likely to reflect their respective government's position, rather than form
alliances with other NGOs in order to pressure governments.25 In other words,
the idea that NGOs will actually counterbalance their governments is not true
and, therefore, we might conclude that the presence ofNGOs really does not add
anything of substance to decision-making in the wro.

22. Padideh Ala'i,Fne Tratk orS,ntai,rab/e Dt11tlop111tnt? AnA.na!Jsir ofthe wro Appellate Bot!J's
Shift to a Mon BalanadApproach to T radt LJberaliz.ation, 14 AM. U. INT'L L REv. 1129 (1999); Patricia
Isela Hansen, Tran,pann9, Standards of Rtvit111, and the U.rt of Trade Mta.r11n.r to Protect the Global
Bnziron111tnt, 39 VA.J. INT'LL 1017 (1999).
23. Gru:yG. Yerkey,LJJ11nchojWTOStrvimTalle.tNtxtYtarC011!tlbeThnattntd,IndJlst,yS011rn.r
Sf!Y, 11 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 44 at 1698 (Nov. 9, 2000).
24. Daniel C. Esty, LJnkage.r and Go11tr11ana: NGOs at the World Trade Ofl,aniz.ation, 19 U. PA.
J. INT'L EcON. L 709 (1998).
25. Gregory C. Shaffer, The WorldTratk Oll,aniz.ation UndtrCha!/engt: Dt111ocra9 andtheL»v and
Politic.r of tht WTO's Tnalmtnt of Tratk and Bnzironmtnl Mattm, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L REV.
(forthcoming 2001).
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C Improve Transparenfl ofthe Dispute &solution Process
The call for increased transparency of the wro process has been sounded
from its critics from the very beginning. Increased transparency leads to
increased legitimacy of international organizations based on the following three
ideas: publicity, precedent, and predictability.26 First, publicity of rules and their
application ensure that participants and observers will understand how the system
actually operates. Second, publication of decisions provides the reasoning of the
tribunal in this case and can also provide persuasive authority. Finally, creating
a body of well-known case law helps create predictability in this system.
In the WTO, all three of these issues are important. While the WTO's rules
are well publicized, there continues to be complaints about the lack of publicity
for its decisions and arguments.27 The current United States position regarding
the DSU focuses on increasing the transparency. In the end, both Member
States and the private actors within them have an interest in the predictability of
the WTO system. Because the WTO is designed to encourage private actors to
take actions, like investing, trading, importing, and exporting, these private actors
must have faith in the law to protect them consistently.
In this reform, the wro has already started to move. 28 Decisions are now
coming down faster and proposals exist to streamline that process further. It is
likely that access to oral arguments and written briefs will also expand. In this
area, the WTO is moving relatively quickly to satisfy concerns over legitimacy.

D. Expanded Standing to Private Acton
Several years ago, the academic literature was filled with articles calling for
expanding the standing requirements at the WTO to include private actors or
NGOs. 29 The support for increased standing is based on several ideas. First,
26. Andrea K. Schneider, Dt111omzq and DispHte Re.rolHtion: lndividlla/Rights in Intemationa/Trode
011,amzatiom, 19 U. PA. J. lNT'L ECON. L 587, 613-14 (1998).
27. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, U.S., EU Refed Compromise Proposal by Japan on fujor111 of WTO
DispHte fut/es, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 40 at 1542 (Oct 12, 2000); Toby J. Mcintosh,I..ang11age
on WTO Tm11Sj)artnfJ Disappoints: Drajt011ta,111e Evidences Deep Divide, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No.
48 at 2001 (Dec. 9, 1999).
28. ReportonExtemalTi:ansparency(Nov.22,2000),at http:/ /www.wto.org/wto/en'l)ish/
news_e/ newsOO_e/gcextemalti:ans_novOO_e.hbnl.
29. Schneider, sr,pranote 26, at 589, 609; Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental 011,anizatiom al the
Wor!t/Trade 011,amzation: Cooperation, Competition, or Exc!Nsion, 1J. INT'L EcON. L. 123 (1998); Steve
Chamovitz, Participation ofNongovmt111ental 011,amzatiom in the Wor!t/ Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'LECON. L. 331 (1996); G. Richard Shell, The Trade Staktho!tln-s Model 011d Participation by Nonstate
Parties in the WorldTmde 011,amzation, 17 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L 359,374 (1996). B11t see Philip M.
Nichols, Extension ofStanding in Worlt/Tmde Organization DispH/es lo Nongovernmental Parties, 17 U. PA.
J. INT'L EcoN. L. 295 (1996) (arguing that NGO involvement would not work logistically); Jeffrey
L. Dunoff, The MisgHided Debate Ovtr NGO Participation at the WTO, 1 J. INT'LECON. L 433 (1998)
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private actors serve as effective private attomey•generals.30 Because private
actors are more likely to bring cases when they are directly harmed than a
government that must make a selection among cases, more cases for violations
will be brought. Furthermore, the decision to bring a case is not colored by
political needs. A government can choose not to bring a case for a number of
reasons. One reason would be concern over the relations with the target of the
case. For example, many believe that the EU withdrawal of the Helms-Burton
case from the WfO was clearly a political rather than legal decision.
A government could also choose not to bring a case because the matter is not
sufficiently important nationally. Smaller violations or violations that have
impacted less powerful sectors of a nation's society may never be brought by a
government. Granting private actors standing eliminates this concern with
political capture.
Finally, private actors have the ability to bring a case against their own
government. Without this standing, violations ofinternational law that primarily
hurt domestic interests (for example, favoring one exporting industry over an
importing industry) would never be addressed.31
It is, however, unlikely that standing in the wro will be expanded any ti.me
soon. The current type of standing-state standing with private actors behind
the scenes-is clearly the type favored by Member States. Member States want
to protect their political prerogatives to select cases.
Without direct standing, private actors have turned to other methods of
participation. One of the methods, the amicus brief, has turned into the latest
flash point for issues oflegiti.macy in the WfO dispute resolution process.
III. THEAMICUS BRIEF BATILE

The battle over the use of amicus briefs is a signpost of many of the issues
that continue to divide the WfO. First, there appears to be some divisions
between developed and developing countries as to the support for amicus briefs.
This section will discuss where those concerns come from and how legitimate
they are. Second, the acceptance of amicus briefs by the Appellate Body, and
then the political response to that acceptance, demonstrates the importance of
coordination between the branches of international organizations. As we have
seen and probably will continue to see with the EU, there are ti.mes where the
ECJ moved faster along a path than the political will in particular Member States
(arguing that private actors are already involved significantly).
·
30. See Weiler, s,pra note 6, at 2421 (noting the importance of citizens to the EU judicial
~-ystem); P.P. Craig, Ona Upon a Time in the Wut: Dirtct Bjfta and the Fedmtliz.alion ofBBC Lmv, 12
OXFORDJ. LEG. STuo. 453 (1992) (arguing that private actors are critical to the enforcement of EU
law).
31. Robert 0. Keohane, et al., Lelflliz.ed Disp11te Resohttion: Interstate andTranmationa4 54 INT'L
ORG. 457, 472-74 (2000).
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was ready to go. This may well be a similar situation concerning the WfO and
amicus briefs. While the law or judiciary may find that amicus briefs are
appropriate, the Member States are not yet politically ready to accept such a
reform.

A The Evolntion ofAmicns Briefs
In 1996, two different disputes faced the possible use of amicus briefs. In the
Reformulated Gas Dispute between the United States, Brazil and Venezuela,32
several environmental groups tried to submit amicus briefs to the WfO panel.
These briefs were sent back by the WfO stating that the groups' arguments
should be addressed directly to the organizations' member government.
Similarly, in the Beef Hormone dispute between the United States and the EU,33
amicus briefs submitted by environmental groups were returned with the
admonition that these briefs were neither welcome nor acceptable.
This practice started to changed in 1998 with the Shrimp-Turtle dispute. In
this case, the governments of India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand were
protesting a U.S. embargo on shrimp harvested by a particular method that
harmed rare sea turtles. There were two briefs filed in 1997. The first brief was
filed jointly by the Center for Marine Conservation and the Center for
International Environmental Law.34 Three other NGOs also joined in the brief:
the Red Nacional de Accion Ecologica from Chile, the Environmental
Foundation from Sri Lanka, and the Philippine Ecological Network. This brief
made the argument as to why amicus briefs should be accepted. Amicus briefs,
these amid argued, will enhance public participation and improve the dispute
settlement process. The brief then made the substantive argument that the U.S.
regulations were appropriate. The second amicus brief also supported the U.S.
law and was filed by the World Wide Fund for Nature along with the Foundation
for International Environmental Law and Development
The four Asian countries protested the amicus briefs arguing that such
submissions were neither contemplated nor authorized by the WI'O's DSU. The
United States, on the other hand, argued that the panel should be able to seek
information from any relevant source. The Panel determined that the U.S. could
attach the briefs to their own submissions and that the four other countries

32. WfO Appellate Body Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Wf/DS2/9 Qan. 29, 1996), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/ distab_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Website).
33. WTO Panel Report on U.S. Complaint-E.C. Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), Wf/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997), atWTO Website, mpra note 32.
34. wro Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, Wf/DS58/AB/R 13.129 (Oct. 12, 1998) (hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle], at
WTO Website, s,pra note 32.
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would have the opportunity to respond 35 On appeal, the Appellate Body
determined that, based on Article 13 of the DSU,36 the Panel "has the
discretionary authority either to accept and consider or to reject information and
advice submitted to it, whether requested by a panel or not."31
The next opportunity to review amicus briefs arose in February 2000 in the
Australian Salmon Case arising between Canada and Australia. 38 In it, the panel
accepted briefs from two Australian fishermen outlining the approach of the
Australian sanitary authorities. The panel noted that the information from the
fisherman was relevant and accepted as part of the record. Just a few months
later, the Appellate Body also had the opportunity to revisit the amicus brief
issue. In the British Steel Case between the U.S. and the EU, two amicus briefs
were filed by U.S. industry groups defending the U.S. procedures. The American
Iron and Steel Institute and the Specialty Steel Industry of North America filed
their briefs separate from the U.S. governmental submission. In response, the
EU argued that the briefs were inadmissable because Article 13 does not apply
to the Appellate Body. Instead, the Appellate Body found authority under Article
17.9 of the DSU,39 which gives the Appellate Body broad procedural authority.
While the Appellate Body noted that it had "no legal duty to accept or consider
unsolicited amicus briefs," the Appellate Body also stated that it does have
authority "to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs in an appeal in which we
find it pertinent and useful to do so."40 In the end, however, the Appellate Body
concluded that it was not necessary to take these two briefs into account in
rendering their decision.41
In three more cases, the right to file amicus submissions continued to be
defined. In the Music Licensing Panel between the U.S. and the EU,42 the panel
accepted a letter written by a law firm on behalf of the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). The panel noted that it would
not outright reject the information provided by the group. A WfO panel also
accepted an amicus brief in a case between the EU and India regarding linen.43
35. See Shrimp/Turtle, sllJira note 34, 'ii 78.
36. See DSU, sllJira note 15, art. 13.
37. Shrimp/Turtle, mpra note 34, "i 108.
38. See WTO Panel Report on Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
wr/DS18/R Qune 12, 1998), atWfO Website, mpra note 32.
39. See DSU, sllJira note 15, art. 17.9.
40. wro Appellate Body Report on United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties
on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United
Kingdom, Wf/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000), atWTO Website, mpra note 32
41. See also Arthur E. Appleton, Amictn C11riae S11bmissio11S in the Carbon Steel Case: Ano/her
Rabbitfrom the Appellate Botfy's Hat?, 3 J. INT'L EcON. L. 691 (2000).
42. WfO Panel Report on United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
Wf/DS160/R "i 6.3 Qune 15, 2000), at WTO Website, mpra note 32.
43. WfO Panel Report on European Communities-Antidumping Measures on Imports of
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, Wf/DS141/R (Oct 30, 2000), atWTO Website, mpranote
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In the Measures Concerning Asbestos between Canada and the EU,44 the panel
received four briefs last year and forwarded all four to the parties. Interestingly,
the EU adopted two of these briefs .into its own submissions. The panel then
accepted these two submissions and gave Canada the opportunity to respond.
The panel did not take .into account the other two submissions. An amicus brief
filed in June 2000 was refused on the basis that the proceedings had progressed
to a stage where the material was too late. The Appellate Body, now hearing the
appeal from the Asbestos Case between Canada and the EU, recently outlined
guidelines for submitting amicus briefs regarding the appeal, .including deadlines
and page limits, all in a case .in which thirteen amicus briefs have been filed so
far.45
It is now clear that both WfO panels and the Appellate Body have the right
to accept amicus briefs. Furthermore, it appears that when these briefs are
attached to a party's submission, the .information is treated as part of the
government's materials for purposes ofaccepting the information and having the
opportunity to respond to it On the other hand, amicus briefs need not
automatically be accepted by the WfO. Moreover, while the amicus briefs have
been permitted, panels and the Appellate Body have yet to actually cite them or
rely on them .in their holdings.

B. Protests over the use ofAmicus Briefs
Many Member States of the WfO are concerned that the WfO dispute
resolution process is becom.ing too open. These Members States object to
allowing all of the various amicus filers to participate. Furthermore, members are
concerned that NGOs now possess more rights than Member States.
These concerns have arisen after the occurrence of two recent events. First,
the United States refused requests from other Member States, .including Australia
and Japan, to sit in on consultations between the U.S. and the EU regarding the
U.S. "carrousel" approach to trade retaliation. (The EU contends that the
carrousel approach violates the WfO.) Second, in the British Steel Case
discussed above, the WfO allowed amicus briefs not attached to a Member
State's filing. Moreover, these amicus briefs came from industry groups rather
than the more traditional NGOs, such as environmental groups. The
32.
44. WfO Panel Report on European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, Wf/DS135/R (Sept 18, 2000), atWfO Website,snpranote 32.
45. Daniel Pruzin, WT0 Appellate Bor!J Sets 011t Proadllmfar NGOs' AmiC11s Briefs i" Asbestos
Case, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 45 at 1751 (Nov. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Pruzin I].
Interestingly, the wro has also rejected at least five of the requests to ~-ubmit an amicus brief filed
under their new rules provoking outrage on the part of several well-known environmental groups.
See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Appellate Bor!J Um/er Fire far Move to Accept Ami= C11riae Britftfrom NG Os,
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 47 at 1805 (Nov. 30, 2000) [hereinafter Pruzin II].
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combination of restrictions on Member States at the same time that private
actors are being granted even more access raises red flags for many, including
those countries such as Australia and the EU, who have long promoted more
transparency.
The concerns come in four types: (1) new policy is being made concerning
amicus briefs by WI'O Panels and the members should be deciding that rather
than the panels; (2) NGOs will have more rights to participate than Member
States; (3) the identity of these non-members is troublesome; and (4) any move
away from the state-to-state interaction in the WI'O is a bad one.
The first concern deals with the actual text of the DSU. Nowhere in the text
of the DSU is amicus brief actually mentioned. Article 13.1 permits the wro
panel to "seek information and technical advice" from wherever it wishes. 46
Article 13.2 further adds that panels "may consult experts to obtain their
opinion." 47 The Appellate Body determined, in the Shrimp/Turtle Case discussed
above, that panels could accept amicus briefs under this language. Critics argue
that since the DSU is silent on amicus briefs, any amendment to the procedures
needs to be approved in advance by the Member States.48 Canada noted that the
Appellate Body's decision in British Steel " 'highlights the importance of
members deciding and clarifying, in the DSU rules, whether amicus briefs should
be permitted and, if so, under what conditions.' " 49 As Japan stated, it " 'is highly
regrettable if the Appellate Body repeatedly makes findings on this controversial
issue without taking into consideration the numerous opposite opinions
expressed by members.' " 50 More recently, the Appellate Body was criticized for
outlining the rules of submission for amicus briefs regarding the Asbestos Case.51
The chairman of the WfO's General Council, Ambassador Kare Bryn of
Norway, said that he would ask the Appellate Body to proceed with extreme
caution regarding the issue of amicus briefs.52
The second argument is that non-members are being given more rights than
Member States to participate in dispute resolution proceedings. While members
need to reserve third-party rights within 10 days of a panel's establishment,
amicus briefs seem to have no set time limit. Furthermore, a member state
cannot submit material to the Appellate Body unless the member state
participated at the panel level. Amicus briefs also have no such requirements.
46. DSU, .r,pra note 15, art. 13.1.
47. Id art 13.2
48. Daniel Pruzin, Kg WTO Mm,bm Sco" Appellate Botfyfar its Dedsion to A capt Amk11s Brieft,
17 Int'l Tmde Rep. (BNA), No. 24 at 924 Oune 15, 2000).
49. Id;seealsoGaryG. Yerkey,CanadianO.fftdalOpposesAl/olllingNGOstoFileAmi=Brieftin
ln-D Disp11te Cases, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 26 at 1141 Ouly 1, 1998).
50. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Mm,btr.t Make Unfriend!J Noises on Friends ofthe Co11rt Dispute Brieft,
17 Int'l Tmde Rep.(BNA), No. 33 at 1283-84 (Aug. 17, 2000).
51. See Pruzin II, slljJranote 45, at 1805.
52. Id
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As India's wro Ambassador noted, the WfO was giving more opportunities
to outside organizations than to Member States. "'[A] situation is devdoping in
which Members have to demand, in such proceedings, treatment no less
favorable to the treatment being accorded the NGOs!' " 53
Moreover, the shift in amicus filers from traditional NGOs to law firms and
business groups clearly has some Member States worried. 54 It is one thing to
imagine that an environmental group might participate, it is another thing to see
well-funded industry groups and law firms participating in the WfO dispute
resolution process.
Finally, members are concerned that the WfO is moving away from being a
state-to-state organization. Countries such as Mexico and Malaysia have long
opposed changing the state-to-state interactions of the Wf0. 55 More recently,
other Asian members have also voiced concern over losing this particular part of
the WfO. After the adoption of the British Sted Case (discussed above), India
stated that the amicus findings are " 'resulting in a situation where not only
nongovernmental voluntary organizations but also powerful business associations
... are able to intervene in the dispute settlement process.' " 56 India also stated,
" 'We do not consider this to be a good devdopment from the point of view of
the long-term health of the dispute settlement system, which is meant to be a
mechanism for resolution of disputes between members.' " 57 For these
members, the advantage of the WfO is that diplomacy has more of an
opportunity to work when disputes are not open to the public.

C. Precedents ofProcedural Expansion
Although the WfO pands and Appdlate Body have not yet made any
substantive use of the amicus briefs, protesters are rightly worried that amicus
briefs could be relied upon in the future. We can examine both the U.S. Supreme
Court and the ECJ for precedent on how emerging court systems enact
expansion of their rules. In Marbury v. Madison, while the U.S. Supreme Court
hdd that the Court had no jurisdiction and could not provide a remedy for Mr.
Marbury, it reached that result only by holding a federal statute (giving the Court
additional jurisdiction) unconstitutional.58 In other words, the first time that the
Court overtly declared and exercised its ability to overturn federal legislation, the
Court did so in a way that placated those most likely and able to criticize the
decision. 59
Pruzin, mpranote 50, at 1285. See also, Pmzin II, mpranote 45, at 1805.
See Pruzin, s,pra note 50, at 1285.
Id at 1283.
Id at 1284.
51. Id.

53.
54.
55.
56.

58. Marbury v. Madi~on, 5 U.S. (1 Crnnch) 137 (1803).
59. As Robert McCloskey so eloquently descnbed Marbury v. Madison, ("The decision is a
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Similarly, the ECJ has on several important cases expanded the scope of EU
law while holding substantively for the member state. In van D1!Jn v. Home Office,
the ECJ held on the substance that the UK had the right to block Miss van
Duyn's entry into the UK61l The UK had recently joined the EC, and the ECJ,
it was speculated, wanted to make sure that the first case from the UK went in
their favor. On the procedural side, however, van Dl!Jn establishes the law that
directives have direct effect. Similarly, the ECJ in the case of Defrenne v. Sabena
made sure that their ruling against Sabena was not retroactive and, therefore,
would not cost the government of Belgium millions of dollars. 61 At the same
time, the Court established that directives have horizontal direct effect giving
individuals in the future the ability to sue other private entities for violating EU
law.
Arguably, the WfO could be seen as effecting the same type of procedural
expansion. While the amicus briefs have not yet been important on the
substance, the WfO has clearly established that they can be submitted. We could
logically assume that it is only a matter of time before one of these amicus briefs
is relied on by the WfO. Furthermore, the WfO's acceptance of amicus briefs
has already been cited by a NAFTA panel in its acceptance of amicus briefs. The
WfO's procedure expansion could have ripple affects.62

IV.

THEORIES OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING AND AMICUS BRIEFS

The battles over amicus briefs only make sense ifwe assume that amicus briefs

do have influence on the judicial body. To examine whether that is in fact the
case, we can look at three theories of judicial decision-making and see what each
of these theories say about the impact of amicus briefs.

A. ugai Model
The legal model of judicial decision-making assumes that judges decide cases
based on their understanding of the legal requirements for that set of facts. 63 In

masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Marshall's capacity to sidestep danger while
i;eeming to court it, to advance in one direction while his opponents are looking in another.")
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 40 (1960).
60. Case 41/74, van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337 (establishing direct effect of
directives).
61. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe anonyme beige de navigation aerienne Sabena, 1976
E.C.R. 455 (recognizing horizontal direct effect [direct effect vis-a-vis private actors) from the
Treaty of Rome).
62. Peter Menyasz, NAFTA Panel St!JS NGOs Can Intervtne in Cases Bro111,ht far Arbitration
P11,poses, 18 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5 at 211 (Feb. 1, 2001).
63. S,e Frank B. Cross, Polititol Sama and th, N111J Legal &a/ism: A Case of Unfart11nate
Int1rrlisciplint11J 11,norantt, 92 Nw. U.L REV. 251, 255-64 (1997) {explaining the history of the legal
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a seminal study on the use of amicus briefs at the United States Supreme Court,
Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill note that the legal model is
clearly the "official" conception of how courts operate. 64 The procedures used
at the Supreme Court-the back and forth of written arguments, oral argument,
and draft opinions, are all designed to ensure that the Court reaches a decision
consistent with the law.
The Supreme Court's treatment of amicus briefs reflects this model. Supreme
Court Rule 37.1 states,.
An ami&Ut curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not
already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the
Court. An amit:flf curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court,
and its filing is not favored. 65

As Kearney and Merrill note, the rule seems to imply that amicus briefs can
influence the Court when the brief addresses the legal merits of the case and
provides new information.
Ifwe apply the legal model to the use of amicus briefs at the WI'O, we would
see that amicus briefs could influence the WfO. However, this influence would
be appropriate given that the information provided in the amicus briefs would
help decision-makers better apply the law. In other words, we might assume that
the Sierra Club or the ASCAP spend more time and money researching their
particular area of interest than does the U.S. government. Therefore, in a case
concerning the environment or music licensing, these NGOs could provide
helpful information to the WfO decision-makers.
If one believes in the legal model of judicial decision-making, amicus briefs are
an appropriate and legitimate way of assisting the court in reaching the correct
decision. 66 The support of the United States for the use of amicus briefs at the
WI'O seems to support this conclusion. The United States has argued that
amicus briefs will increase the participation in and the transparency of the WfO

model); Nathan Hakman, Lobi?Jing the SNjJm11t u~An Apprai.ral of "Political Sdmce Foll&irr, "35
FORDHAM L. REv. 15, 47-50 (1967) (defending the legal model as appropriate for the study of

amicus briefs).
64. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Illjlnma ofAmian Curiae Briefs 011 the SNjJrtlllt
Com, 148 u. PENN. L REV. 743, 776 (2000).
65. Sup. Ct. R. 37.1.
66. Stt gmral/J Dinah Shelton, Tht Parlidpalion oJNongomnmmtal Orgalliz.alions in I11tm,alio11al
]11dida/ Proaedingt, 88 AM. J. INT'LL 611 (1994) (calling for greater acceptance of amicus briefs on
behalf ofNGOs in international courts).
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dispute resolution system.67 In the end, the United States argues, that the use of
amicus briefs will increase the legitimacy of the wro.

B. The.Attitudinal Model
Political scientists, however, have long attacked the legal model as a poor
explanatory tool for the outcome of cases.68 Instead, political scientists have
overwhelmingly adopted the attitudinal model for studying the Supreme Court 69
The attitudinal model argues that judges decide cases based on their political
preferences. The model assumes that judges have liberal to conservative
tendencies, fixed by the time they are appointed to the Court, and then apply
those tendencies to facts in cases as they arise.70
Under the attitudinal model, amicus briefs should have minimal impact7 1
Since judges' preferences are already fixed, information from the amicus briefs
would rarely impact the judge who would already have applied his political beliefs
to the set of facts.
The interesting thing in the wro battle over the amicus briefs is that no one
has been arguing that amicus briefs are irrelevant Perhaps these voices are silent
After all, if one does not think that amicus briefs matter, one is unlikely to engage
in the battle. Clearly, the loudest voices in the amicus brief battle including the
wro, do not implicitly adhere to this particular theory.

67. U.S. Ambassador to the WfO, Rita Hayes, stated after the British Steel Case when the
Appellate Body outlined its right to receive amicus briefs that the Appellate Body, C' 'has taken a
positive step in the direction of making the WfO a more open organization and enhancing public
confidence in the WfO dispute settlement process.' '') Pruzin, lll}ra note 48, at 924. The U.S. has
also defended the Appellate Body's guidelines in the Asbestos Case to the General Council, but was
only joined by New Zealand and Switzerland. Ste Pruzin II, lll}ra note 45, at 1806.
68. JEFFREY A. SEGAL&HAROLD].SPAETH,THE SUPREME COURT ANDTI-IEATfITUDINAL
MODEL 62-65 (1993) (attacking the legal model as meaningless).
69. See Cross, s,pra note 63, at 252 n.4; Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace,Jmtict.r' Rtsponse.r lo
Case Fads: An lnteradive Motil/, 24 AM. POI.. Q. 237, 237-38 (1996). ("Without question, the
attitudinal model has dominated the study of judicial choice and stands unchallenged as the best
representation of voting on the merits in the nation's highest court.'') Id.
70. SEGAL & SPAETil, s,pra note 68, at 65; SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE
INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF PRECEDENT ON TI-IE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992 109 (1995);
Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, ldlologkal Val,m and the Votes of U.S. S,pm,,e CoHrt ]11sliees, 83
AM. POI.. SCI. REv. 557, 561-63 (1989). BHt see Patricia M Wald, A fuspo11Se to Tiller and Cross, 99
COLUM.L.REV. 235 (1999) (disagreeing with the attitudinal model);]. Randolph Block,Book.Rtvie,v,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RF.S. J. 617,624 (reviewing HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY
MAKING: EvALUATION AND PREDICflON (1979) {calling the attitudinal model an intellectual toy)).
71. As Segal and Spaeth note, C'[I]nterest groups have little tangible to offer the justices, apart
from some information--occasionally not otherwise available-that may marginally ease their
reaching a decision.'') SEGAL & SPAETH, lll}ra note 68, at 241.
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C. The Intere.rt Group Model
A third potential model to explain the use of amicus briefs is the interest
group model. 72 Under this model, interest groups use amicus briefs to lobby the
court in the same way they would lobby the legislature.73 Judges decide cases
based on what they perceive as the popular will, which is reflected by what these
interest groups convey to the court. 1hls theory, which is similar to the public
choice theory used by some legal scholars to explain legislative choices, is now
being applied to judicial choices as well.74
This model contrasts sharply with the two previous models. Judges neither
decide cases based on the legal requirements nor on their policy preferences.
Instead, they decide cases in order to satisfy the interest group's political
demands. Judges do not have fixed political or ideological preferences other than
to gain approval from the respective group.
The interest group model of judging is similar to the interest group model of
legislative behavior.75 In both, the desire to make interest groups happy comes
from the goal of maximizing personal benefit. While legislators focus on
reelection, judges too could focus on personal benefits to be gained by ruling one
way or another. Lower level judges might be concerned with reappointment or
even their career after stepping down. Even the prestigious life-appointed
Supreme Court Justices could worry about their reputation. As Kearney &
Merrill posit, "This concern with enhancing their reputation, the self-interest
argument suggests, drives the Justices to adopt the preferred positions of the
most influential interest groups, because these groups have the capacity to affect
the Justice's reputation with key audiences."76 Supreme CourtJustices could also
be concerned with the reputation of the Court as a whole and could, therefore,
want to ensure that the Court is generally following public opinion in order to
ensure public respect and deference.
Under the interest group model, the potential influence of amicus briefs is
great. Because judges want to know what the public thinks, and particularly what
72. See NEALK. KOMESAR,lMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 53-97, 123-50 (1994) (arguing that the interest group theory of
politics should also be applied to the judiciary); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest GrolljJ Theo,y ]11stijj
Mort Intntsive Judicial&viezv?, 101 YALELJ. 31, 35-48 (1991).
73. ("[A)mici's view of their own efforts is akin to that ofgroups lobbying before Congress.'')
Andrew P. Morriss, Priuate Amici Curiae and the SlljJrt111e Court's 1997-1998 Term Employment Lazv
]urispmdenct, 7 WM. &MARYBILLRTS.J. 823,829 (1999).
74. Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGALSTIJD. 259, 278-79 (1999);
Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theo,y ]ustijj ]1lflicia/Aaivis111 AfterAll?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 220 (1997).
75. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRmCAL
lNTRODUGnON (1991). For more general information on public choice theory, see Symposium,
Theo,yoJPublicChoia, 74 VA.L.REv.167-518 (1988).
76. Kearney & Merrill, SlljJra note 64, at 784.
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influential groups think, the amicus briefs provide a bellwether of that opinion.
Furthennore, the identity of the amicus brief filer and the number of briefs filed
would have far more weight with judges than any legal argument actually put
forth in the brief. In other words, while under the legal model, amicus briefs
might provide helpful legal arguments or information; under the interest group
model, the most helpful information in the brief is who filed it
If one believes in the interest group model, one could be legitimately
suspicious of amicus briefs.77 Amicus briefs would unduly persuade the court in
an inappropriate manner, not at all based on law. This suspicion of amicus briefs
does seem to be the basis of the arguments put forth by countries in the WfO
that do not want amicus briefs admitted. If decision-makers in the WfO
become concerned about public opinion, as demonstrated through NGO briefs,
then decision-makers might allow these groups more or equal influence than the
states actually participating in the dispute. India, among other countries, argues
that in a process that should be limited to states, permitting amicus briefs
inappropriately shifts the balance of power between states and civil society.
Furthennore, because many of the NGOs who have the resources to file amicus
briefs will be from developed countries, developing countries worry that these
NGOs will be engaging in a different type of "ecoimperialism." It is bad enough,
a developing country might argue, that it has to defend itself against developed
countries without permitting additional, and perhaps persuasive, parties to also
join the fight
V. LESSONS FROM THE SUPREME COURT

A Empirical Rmtlts 011 the Legal Models
Kearney and Merrill studied all of the argued merits decisions from the 1946
Term through the 1995 Term of the Supreme Court and examined the impact of
amicus briefs on the Court.78 They foundanumberofinterestingpatterns, some
of which we can translate into the WfO. Amicus briefs supporting respondents
were more successful than briefs supporting petitioners. Small disparities of one
or two briefs for one side with none for the other may impact the success of that
side but larger disparities do not appear to have an impact. Amicus briefs cited
by the Court are not any more likely to be on the winning side than briefs not
cited. Amicus briefs filed by experienced lawyers appear to be more successful
than those filed by inexperienced lawyers. Finally, institutional litigants,
77. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1996) (Scalia,]., dissenting) (noting that all
of the 14 amicus briefs filed with the court support a psychotherapist's privilege in federal court).
("Not a single amit111 brief was filed in support of petitioner. That is no surprise. There is no selfinterested organization out there devoted to pursuit of the truth in the federal courts.") Id.
18. See Kearney & Merrill, rtpra note 64, at 751-61.
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particularly the Solicitor-General, have had greater success when filing amicus
briefs than non-institutional litigants.
Kearney and Merrill interpret their results to support the legal model of
judicial decisionmaking for several reasons. First, because amicus briefs do
appear to influence the Court over time and in a variety of contexts, the
attitudinal model does not apply. Second, large disparities in the numbers of
amicus briefs filed on one side are not linked to that side's success. This thus
counters the interest group model assumption that brief counting should be able
to predict outcomes. Finally, it appears that briefs that do provide new
information or good legal arguments successfully influence the Court.
Institutional litigants and experienced lawyers are exactly the type of filers who
know what type of information is most helpful to the court and are more
successful than other types of filers. Moreover, Kearney and Merrill argue,
[t)he greater success associated with amicus briefs supporting respondents can be
explained by the supposition that respondents are more likely than petitioners to
be represented by inexperienced lawyers in the Supreme Court and hence are more
likely to benefit from supporting amcici, which can supply the Court with
additional legal arguments and facts overlooked by the respondents' lawyers.79

B. Translations to the WTO
There are two questions from this study that have implications for the WfO:
(1) how can this translate to the WfO? And (2) can findings from the U.S.
Supreme Court be translated into the WfO? If the legal model is the correct
model for judicial decision-making everywhere, then NGOs will gain influence
over time through the filing of amicus briefs. Those NGOs that become repeat
players, gain or hire experienced lawyers and begin to institutionalize themselves
into the WfO process should see increased success under the legal model. For
example, if the Sierra Club becomes like the AFL-CIO in front of the Supreme
Court, it should have a higher success rate than other types of amicus filers.
Furthermore, if powerful NGOs come to the aid of less experienced states in
front of the WfO, we would expect to see that those NGOs could be helpful.
Those in favor of the legal model argue that reliance on amicus briefs is
appropriate. They would argue that the amicus brief is providing helpful
information and even corrects an imbalance of power. As a result, the WfO
panels and Appellate Body would better apply the law, and the process of dispute
resolution is more democratic and more legitimate.
Detractors of amicus briefs at the WfO, on the other hand, do have reason
to be concerned. The idea of repeat non-state actors at the WfO being able to
influence the outcome of cases is abhorrent to those states who want to protect
state prerogatives in international organizations.
79. Kearney & Merrill, mpra note 64, at 750.
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The second question may be even more important. It is unclear that the
findings at the Supreme Court would translate to the wro. Although the
Appellate Body is appointed for a set tenn, WfO panels are appointed ad hoc,
and neither set of jurists have life tenure. Moreover, Supreme Court Justices
have no other employ and are less likely to worry about their career after the
Court. Panel members in the wro are often practicing attorneys, government
officials, and others who have ongoing lives outside the wro. Political scientists
could argue that the pressure to be re-appointed and other personal goals may
outweigh a strict adherence to the law. These jurists would be more likely to
operate under an interest group model. Furthennore, one could argue, jurists in
the WI'O are basically writing on a clean slate compared to the 200 years of
rulings from the Supreme Court. With more room for interpretation, wro
jurists might understandably look to interest groups for clarification. Finally,
given the desire to build the respect and reputation of the WfO as a new
institution versus the large stature that the Supreme Court already maintains, the
WfO decision-makers would arguably be far more deferential to interest groups
than the Supreme Court.
If the attitudinal model is the one to apply to the WfO (or even just the
panelsBO_}, the influence of amicus briefs becomes far more problematic. Instead
of legitimately helping the WfO to correctly apply the law, interest groups
possess undue influence solely based on their identity and resources. Amicus
filers could begin to outweigh states in their importance in cases. If states
perceive that well-funded groups from developed countries have more influence
than developing countries, the wro will be undermined as a fair and legitimate
process.
Another point of analysis for a future article is to use these judicial models to
analyze the role of third party states in disputes. While the rights of amicus briefs
are still being debated, it is clear that third party states have the right to intervene
in WI'O disputes. Some of the lessons from the Supreme Court study could also
apply to third parties, particularly in tenns of experienced lawyers and repeat
players. One could imagine a situation in several years where the U.S. had a
history of intervening in cases and becoming quite influential at the expense of
smaller states who appear less often before the WfO.

80. The legal service of the WfO provides ba.~ically the same support and legal advice at both
stages of dispute resolution and, therefore, one might argue the difference between the Appellate
Body and the Pands is minimal.
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VI. CONCLUSION

There are a number of points to draw from the amicus brief battle. First, in
the eyes ofNGOs, it clearly makes sense to continue to push for the acceptance
and use of amicus briefs. Whether one believes in the legal model or the interest
group model of judicial decision-making, amicus briefs can influence those
decisions. At the same time, Member States of the WI'O who are suspicious
about the increased involvement ofNGOs at the wro are also correct to worry
about the impact of these briefs.
Second, the question of which model applies to the WTO remains an open
one, ripe for further analysis. Given the expertise within the legal service of the
WfO and the detailed intricacy of trade agreements, one could clearly argue that
the legal model is the most appropriate. Decisions are made by applying the
treaties to the particular set of facts at hand If this model is the correct one,
then amicus briefs are appropriate and legitimate ways of democratizing the
WfO dispute resolution process and ensuring better decisions for all parties.
On the other hand, WfO panelists and Appellate Body members could be
concerned with the overall view of the WTO, with their own careers in and out
of the WI'O, and other personal concerns resulting in an interest group model.
Under this model, amicus briefs are insidious. They inappropriately persuade
decision-makers to base their rulings on factors other than the treaty law.
Amicus briefs take power away from the Member States and the rules members
have agreed upon and, instead, shift this power to well-funded NGOs with
narrow interests.
The third model discussed in the article, the attitudinal model, would argue
that amicus briefs are irrelevant. If, in fact, the WfO operates along this model,
and panelists have already determined opinions on trade law, then the entire
battle about amicus briefs is energy wasted. According to the attitudinal model,
we should be spending this energy on screening panelists themselves.
Finally, the amicus brief battle can be used as a lens to examine the ongoing
stresses in the WTO as the organization evolves. Broader issues over the role of
the judiciary, the evolution of jurisdiction, and the role of civil society are all
brought to the surface in this particular dilemma. How the WI'O resolves these
and how the Member States respond gives us insight into the growth and future
oftheWfO.

